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NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: RESEARCH
ON THE FETUS
DELIBERATIONS AND

CONCLUSIONS

The charge to the Commission is to investigate and study research
involving the living fetus and to make recommendations to the Secretary, DHEW, on "policies defining the circumstances (if any) under
which such research may be conducted or supported." The Commission
has attempted to fulfill that duty by conducting investigations into research on the fetus and by providing a public forum for the presentation
and analysis of views on this subject. It must be recognized that the
Commission was placed under severe limitations of time by its Congressional mandate. As a result, these considerations on research involving fetuses have necessarily been developed prior to the Commission's larger task of studying the nature of research, the basic ethical
principles which should guide it, the problem of informed consent and
the review process.
After the Commission identified the information that was required
for adequate consideration of the charge, a compendium of pertinent
scientific literature and medical experience was prepared by consultants
and contractors. In addition, a broad range of views was presented in
letters, reports and testimony by theologians, philosophers, physicians,
scientists, lawyers, public officials and private citizens. The Commission
then undertook critical analysis of the studies and presentations, and
conducted public deliberations on the issues involved. Finally, the
Commission formulated its Recommendations.
This section of the Commission's report summarizes the reasoning
and conclusions that emerged during the deliberations. Section IX of
the report sets forth the Commission's Recommendations to the Secretary, DHEW. These Recommendations arise from and are consistent
with the Deliberations and Conclusions of the Commission. The Recommendations should be considered only within the context of the
Deliberations that precede them.
A. Preface to Deliberations and Conclusions. Throughout the
deliberations of the Commission, the belief has been affirmed that the
fetus as a human subject is deserving of care and respect. Although the
Commission has not addressed directly the issues of the personhood
and the civil status of the fetus, the members of the Commission are
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convinced that moral concern should extend to all who share human
genetic heritage, and that the fetus, regardless of life prospects, should
be treated respectfully and with dignity.
The members of the Commission are also convinced that medical
research has resulted in significant improvements in the care of the
unborn threatened by death or disease, and they recognize that further
progress is anticipated. Within the broad category of medical research,
however, public concern has been expressed with regard to the nature
and necessity of research on the human fetus. The evidence presented
to the Commission was based upon a comprehensive search of the
world's literature and a review of more than 3000 communications in
scientific periodicals. The preponderance of all research involved experimental procedures designed to benefit directly a fetus threatened by
premature delivery, disease or death, or to elucidate normal processes
or development. Some research constituted an element in the health
care of pregnant women. Other research involved only observation or
the use of noninvasive procedures bearing little or no risk. A final class
of investigation (falling outside the present mandate of the Commission) has made use of tissues of the dead fetus, in accordance with
accepted standards for treatment of the human cadaver. The Commission finds that, to the best of its knowledge, these types-of research have
not contravened accepted ethical standards.
Nonetheless, the Commission notes that there have been instances
of abuse in the area of fetal research. Moreover, differences of opinion
exist as to whether desired results could have been attained without the
"use of the human fetus in nontherapeutic research.
Concern has also been expressed that the poor and minority groups
may bear an inequitable burden as research subjects. The Commission
believes that those groups which are most vulnerable to inequitable
treatment should receive special protection.
The Commission concludes that some information which is in the
public interest and which provides significant advances in health care
can be attained only through the use of the human fetus as a research
subject. The Recommendations which follow express the Commission's
belief that, while the exigencies of research and the moral imperatives
of fair and respectful treatment may appear to be mutually limiting,
they are not incompatible.
B. Ethical Principles and Requirements Governing Research
on Human Subjects with Special Reference to the Fetus and the Pregnant Woman. The Commission has a mandate to develop the ethical
principles underlying the conduct of all research involving human sub-
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jects. Until it can adequately fulfill this charge, its statement of principles is necessarily limited. In the interim, it proposes the following
as basic ethical principles for use of human subjects in general, and
research involving the fetus and the pregnant woman in particular.
Scientific inquiry is a distinctly human endeavor. So, too, is the
protection of individual integrity. Freedom of inquiry and the social
benefits derived therefrom, as well as protection of the individual are
valued highly and are to be encouraged. For the most part, they are
compatible pursuits. When occasionally they appear to be in conflict,
efforts must be made through public deliberation to effect a resolution.
In effecting this resolution, the integrity of the individual is preeminent. It is therefore the duty of the Commission to specify the
boundaries that respect for the fetus must impose upon freedom of
scientific inquiry. The Commission has considered the principles proposed by ethicists in relation to the exigencies of scientific inquiry, the
requirements and present limitations of medical practice, and legal commentary. Among the general principles for research on human subjects
judged to be valid and binding are: (1) to avoid harm whenever possible, or at least to minimize harm; (2) to provide for fair treatment
by avoiding discrimination between classes or among members of the
same class; and (3) to respect the integrity of human subjects by
requiring informed consent. An additional principle pertinent to the
issue at hand is to respect the human character of the fetus.
To this end, the Commission concludes that in order to be considered ethically acceptable, research involving the fetus should be
determined by adequate review to meet certain general requirements:
(1) Appropriate prior investigations using animal models
and nonpregnant humans must have been completed.
(2) The knowledge to be gained must be important and obtainable by no reasonable alternative means.
(3) Risks and benefits to both the mother and the fetus must
have been fully evaluated and described.
(4) Informed consent must be sought and granted under
proper conditions.
(5) Subjects must be selected so that risks and benefits will
not fall inequitably among economic, racial, ethnic and social classes.
These requirements apply to all research on the human fetus. In
the application of these principles, however, the Commission found it
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helpful to consider the following distinctions: (1) therapeutic and
nontherapeutic research; (2) research directed toward the pregnant
woman and that directed toward the fetus; (3) research involving the
fetus-going-to-4erm and the fetus-to-be-aborted; (4) research occurring
before, during or after an abortion procedure; and (5) research which
involves the nonviable fetus ex utero and that which involves the possibly viable infant. The first two distinctions encompass the entire
period of the pregnancy through delivery; the latter three refer to
different portions of the developmental continuum.
The Commission observes that the fetus is sometimes an unintended
subject of research when a woman participating in an investigation
is incorrectly presumed not to be pregnant. Care should be taken to
minimize this possibility.
C. Application to Research Involving the Fetus. The application
of the general principles enumerated above to the use of the human fetus
as a research subject presents problems because the fetus cannot be a
willing participant in experimentation. As with children, the comatose
and other subjects unable to consent, difficult questions arise regarding
the -balance of risk and benefit and the validity of proxy consent.
In particular, some would question whether subjects unable to
consent should ever be subjected to risk in scientific research. However, there is general agreement that where the benefits as well as the
risks of research accrue to the subject, proxy consent may be presumed
adequate to protect the subject's interests. The more difficult case is
that where the subject must bear risks without direct benefit.
The Commission has not yet studied the issues surrounding informed consent and the validity of proxy consent for nontherapeutic
research (including the difficult issue of consent by a pregnant minor).
These problems will be explored under the broader mandate of the
Commission. In the interim, the Commission has taken various perspectives into consideration in its deliberations about the use of the
fetus as a subject in different research settings. The Deliberations and
Conclusions of the Commission regarding the application of general
principles to the use of the fetus as a human subject in scientific research
are as follows:
1. In therapeutic research directed toward the fetus, the fetal
subject is selected on the basis of its health condition, benefits and risks
accrue to that fetus, and proxy consent is directed toward that subject's
own welfare. Hence, with adequate review to assess scientific merit,
prior research, the balance of risks and benefits, and the sufficiency of
the consent process, such research conforms with all relevant principles
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and is both ethically acceptable and laudable. In view of the necessary
involvement of the woman in such research, her consent is considered
mandatory; in view of the father's possible ongoing responsibility, his
objection is considered sufficient to veto.
2. Therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman
may expose the fetus to risk for the benefit of another subject and thus
is at first glance more problematic. Recognizing the woman's priority
regarding her own health care, however, the Commission concludes
that such research is ethically acceptable provided that the woman has
been fully informed of the possible impact on the fetus and that other
general requirements have been met. Protection for the fetus is further
provided by requiring that research put the fetus at minimum risk consistent with the provision of health care for the woman. Moreover,
therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman frequently
benefits the fetus, though it need not necessarily do so. In view of
the woman's right to privacy regarding her own health care, the Commission concludes that the informed consent of the woman is both
necessary and sufficient.
In general, the Commission concludes that therapeutic research
directed toward the health condition of either the fetus or the pregnant
woman is, in principle, ethical. Such research benefits not only the
individual woman or fetus but also women and fetuses as a class, and
should therefore be encouraged actively.
The Commission, in making recommendations on therapeutic and
nontherapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman, (Recommendations (2) and (3)), in no way intends to preclude research on
improving abortion techniques otherwise permitted by law and government regulation.
3. Nontherapeutic research directed toward the fetus in utero
or toward the pregnant woman poses difficult problems because the
fetus may be exposed to risk for the benefit of others.
Here, the Commission concludes that where no additional risks
are imposed on the fetus (e.g., where fluid withdrawn during the course
of treatment is used additionally for nontherapeutic research), or where
risks are so minimal as to be negligible, proxy consent by the parent(s)
is sufficient to provide protection. (Hence, the consent of the woman
is sufficient provided the father does not object.) The Commission
recognizes that the term "minimal" involves a value judgment and
acknowledges that medical opinion will differ regarding what constitutes
''minimal risk." Determination of acceptable minimal risk is a function
of the review process.
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When the risks cannot be fully assessed, or are more than minimal,
the situation is more problematic. The Commission affirms as a general
principle that manifest risks imposed upon nonconsenting subjects cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the Commission concludes that only minimal risk can be accepted as permissible for nonconsenting subjects in
nontherapeutic research.
The Commission affirms that the woman's decision for abortion
does not, in itself, change the status of the fetus for purposes of protection. Thus, the same principles apply whether or not abortion is
contemplated; in both cases, only minimal risk is acceptable.
Differences of opinion have arisen in the Commission, however,
regarding the interpretation of risk to the fetus-to-be-aborted and thus
whether some experiments that would not be permissible on a fetusgoing-to-term might be permissible on a fetus-to-be-aborted. Some
members hold that no procedures should be applied to a fetus-to-beaborted that would not be applied to a fetus-going-4o-term. Indeed, it
was also suggested that any research involving fetuses-to-be-aborted
must also involve fetuses-going-to-term. Others argue that, while a
woman's decision for abortion does not change the status of the fetus
per se, it does make a significant difference in one respect - namely, in
the risk of harm to the fetus. For example, the injection of a drug which
crosses the placenta may not injure the fetus which is aborted within
two weeks of injection, where it might injure the fetus two months after
injection. There is always, of course, the possibility that a woman
might change her mind about the abortion. Even taking this into account, however, some members argue that risks to the fetus-to-beaborted may be considered "minimal" in research which would entail
more than minimal risk for a fetus-going-to-term.
There is basic agreement among Commission members as to the
validity of the equality principle. There is disagreement as to its application to individual fetuses and classes of fetuses. Anticipating that
differences of interpretation will arise over the application of the basic
principles of equality and the determination of "minimal risk," the
Commission recommends review at the national level. The Commission
believes that such review would provide the appropriate forum for
determination of the scientific and public merit of such research. In
addition, such review would facilitate public discussion of the sensitive
issues surrounding the use of vulnerable nonconsenting subjects in
research.
The question of consent is a complicated one in this area of research. The Commission holds that procedures that are part of the
research design should be fully disclosed and clearly distinguished from
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those which are dictated by the health care needs of the pregnant woman
or her fetus. Questions have been raised regarding the validity of
parental proxy consent where the parent(s) have made a decision for
abortion. The Commission recognizes that unresolved problems both
of law and of fact surround this question. It is the considered opinion,
however, that women who have decided to abort should not be presumed to abandon thereby all interest in and concern for the fetus. In
view of the close relationship between the woman and the fetus, therefore, and the necessary involvement of the woman in the research
process, the woman's consent is considered necessary. The Commission
is divided on the question of whether her consent alone is sufficient.
Assignment of an advocate for the fetus was proposed as an additional
safeguard; this issue will be thoroughly explored in connection with
the Commission's review of the consent process. Most of the Commissioners agree that in view of the father's possible responsibility for
the child, should it be brought to term, the objection of the father should
be sufficient to veto. Several Commissioners, however, hold that for
nontherapeutic research directed toward the pregnant woman, the
woman's consent alone should be sufficient and the father should have
no veto.
4. Research on the fetus during the abortion procedure or on
the nonviable fetus ex utero raises sensitive problems because such a
fetus must be considered a dying subject. By definition, therefore, the
research is nontherapeutic in that the benefits will not accrue to the
subject. Moreover, the question of consent is complicated because of
the special vulnerability of the dying subject.
The Commission considers that the status of the fetus as dying
alters the situation in two ways. First, the question of risk becomes
less relevant, since the dying fetus cannot be "harmed" in the sense of
"injured for life." Once the abortion procedure has begun, or after it
is completed, there is no chance of a change of mind on the woman's
part which will result in a living, injured subject. Second, however,
while questions of risk become less relevant, considerations of respect
for the dignity of the fetus continue to be of paramount importance, and
require that the fetus be treated with the respect due to dying subjects.
While dying subjects may not be "harmed" in the sense of "injured
for life," issues of violation of integrity are nonetheless central. The
Commission concludes, therefore, that out of respect for the dying subjects, no nontherapeutic interventions are permissible which would alter
the duration of life of the nonviable fetus ex utero.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 3

1976-19771

FETAL RESEARCH

Additional protection is provided by requiring that no significant
changes are made in the abortion procedure strictly for purposes of
research. The Commission was divided on the question of whether a
woman has a right to accept modifications in the timing or method of
the abortion procedure in the interest of research, and whether the investigator could ethically request her to do so. Some Commission members desired that neither the research nor the investigator in any way
influence the abortion procedure; others felt that modifications in timing
or method of abortion were acceptable provided no new elements of
risk were introduced. Still others held that even if modifications increased the risk, they would be acceptable provided the woman had been
fully informed of all risk, and provided such modifications did not postpone the abortion beyond the twentieth week of gestational age (five
lunar months, four and one-half calendar months). Despite this division
of opinion, the Recommendation of the Commission on this matter is
that the design and conduct of a nontherapeutic research protocol should
not determine the recommendations by a physician regarding the advisability, timing or method of abortion. No members of the Commission
desired less stringent measures.
Furthermore, it is possible that, due to mistaken estimation of
gestational age, an abortion may issue in a possibly viable infant. If
there is any danger that this might happen, research which would entail
more than minimal risk would be absolutely prohibited. In order to
avoid that possibility the Commission recommends that, should research
during abortion 'be approved by national review, it be always on condition that estimated gestational age be below 20 weeks. There is, of
course, a moral and legal obligation to attempt to save the life of a
possibly viable infant.
Finally, the Commission has been made aware that certain research,
particularly that involving the living nonviable fetus, has disturbed the
moral sensitivity of many persons. While it believes that its Recommendations would preclude objectionable research by adherence to strict
review processes, problems of interpretation or application of the Commission's Recommendations may still arise. In that event, the Commission proposes ethical review on a national level in which informed
public disclosure and assessment of the problems, the type of proposed
research and the scientific and public importance of the expected results
can take place.
D. Review Procedures. The Commission will conduct comprehensive studies of existing review mechanisms in connection with its
broad mandate to develop guidelines and make recommendations con-
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cerning ethical issues involved in research on human subjects. Until the
Commission has completed these studies, it can offer only tentative conclusions and recommendations regarding review mechanisms.
In the interim, the Commission finds that existing review procedures required by statute (P.L. 93-348) and DHEW regulations
(45 C.F.R. 46) suffice for all therapeutic research involving the pregnant
woman and the fetus, and for all nontherapeutic research which imposes
minimal or no risk and which would be acceptable for conduct of a fetus
in utero to be carried to term or on an infant. Guidelines to be employed
under the existing review procedures include: (1) importance of the
knowledge to be gained; (2) completion of appropriate studies on
animal models and nonpregnant humans and existence of no reasonable
alternative; (3) full evaluation and disclosure of the risks and benefits
that are involved; and (4) supervision of the conditions under which
consent is sought and granted, and of the information that is disclosed
during that process.
The case is different, however, for nontherapeutic research directed
toward a pregnant woman or a fetus if it involves more than minimal
risk or would not be acceptable for application to an infant. Questions
may arise concerning the definition of risk or the assessment of scientific
and public importance of the research. In such cases, the Commission
considers current review procedures insufficient. It recommends these
categories be reviewed by a national review body to determine whether
the proposed research could be conducted within the spirit of the Commission's recommendations. It would interpret these recommendations
and apply them to the proposed research, and in addition, assess the
scientific and public value of the anticipated results of the investigation.
The national review panel should be composed of individuals having diverse backgrounds, experience and interests, and be so constituted
as to be able to deal with the legal, ethical, and medical issues involved
in research on the human fetus. In addition to the professions of law,
medicine, and the research sciences, there should be adequate representation of women, members of minority groups, and individuals conversant with the various ethical persuasions of the general community.
Inasmuch as even such a panel cannot always judge public attitudes, panel meetings should be open to the public, and, in addition,
public participation through written and oral submissions should be
sought.
E. Compensation. The Commission expressed a strong conviction
that considerable attention be given to the issue of provision of compensation to those who may be -injured as a consequence of their participation as research subjects.
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Concerns regarding the use of inducements for participation in
research are only partially met by the Commission's Recommendation
(14) on the prohibition of the procurement of an abortion for research
purposes. Compensation not only for injury from research but for
participation in research as a normal volunteer or in a therapeutic situation will be part of later Commission deliberations.
F. Research Conducted Outside the United States. The Commission has considered the advisability of modifying its standards for research which is supported by the Secretary, DHEW, and is conducted
outside the United States. It has concluded that its recommendations
should apply as a simple minimal standard, but that research should
also comply with any more stringent limitations imposed by statutes or
standards of the country in which the research will be conducted.
G. The Moratorium on Fetal Research. The Commission notes
that the restrictions on fetal research (imposed by Section 213 of P.L.
93-348) have been construed broadly throughout the research community, with the result that ethically acceptable research, which might
yield important biomedical information, has been halted. For this
reason, it is considered in the public interest that the moratorium be
lifted immediately, that the Secretary take special care thereafter that
the Commission's concerns for the protection of the fetus as a research
subject are met, and appropriate regulations based upon the Commission's recommendations be implemented within a year from the date
of submission of this report to the Secretary, DHEW. Until final regulations are published, the existing review panels at the agency and
institutional levels should utilize the Deliberations and Recommendations of the Commission in evaluating the acceptability of all grant and
contract proposals submitted for funding.
H. Synthesis. The Commission concludes that certain prior conditions apply broadly to all research involving the fetus, if ethical considerations are to be met. These requirements include evidence of
pertinent investigations in animal models and nonpregnant humans,
lack of alternative means to obtain the information, careful assessment
of the risks and benefits of the research, and procedures to ensure that
informed consent has been sought and granted under proper conditions.
Determinations as to whether these essential requirements have been
met may be made under existing review procedures, pending study by
the Commission of the entire review process.
In the judgment of the Commission, thereapeutic research directed
toward the health care of the pregnant woman or the fetus raises little
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concern, provided it meets the essential requirements for research involving the fetus, and is conducted under appropriate medical and
legal safeguards.
For the most part, nontherapeutic research involving the fetus to
be carried to term or the fetus before, during or after abortion is acceptable so long as it imposes minimal or no risk to the fetus and, when
abortion is involved, imposes no change in the timing or procedure for
terminating pregnancy which would add 'any significant risk. When a
research protocol or procedure presents special problems of interpretation or application of these guidelines, it should be subject to national
ethical review; and it should be approved only if the knowledge to be
gained is of medical importance, can be obtained in no other way, and
the research proposal does not offend community sensibilities.
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